ETHGas
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DocsGovernance & Staking
  • Welcome
    • What are Gas Markets?
  • Overview
  • The Design Process
  • Architecture
  • Products
    • Inclusion Preconfirmations
    • Execution Preconfirmations
    • Whole Block Commitments
    • Base Fee Futures
  • Actors & Integrations
    • Validators
      • Collateral AVS
    • Commitment Buyers
    • Builders & Sequencers
    • Relays
    • Traders
  • Security
  • Developers
  • Governance
  • Developer Docs
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  • Commit Boost
  • Collateral & Slashing
  • What is Considered a Slashable Event?
  • Providing Collateral
  • Collateral Amounts
  • Execution of Slashing Event
  • Default Pricing Settings for Validators
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  1. Actors & Integrations

Validators

Support of L1 Validators is critical in building the marketplace and creating off-the-shelf product availability for buyers. As such, we have designed both the Marketplace and Product suite to align highly with their interests.

ETHGas is designed to unambiguously earn more than running MEV Boost alone with both minimal risk and minimal technical integration required.

[ 30 ] % of all Fee income for a specific Slot is shared with the Proposer of such slot. Proposers may partake additionally in up to [ 50 ]% of the fees via our [ Staking Incentive Program ] (Details soon)

To get started, Validators must use Commit Boost and transfer the appropriate Collateral.

Commit Boost

Commit Boost is a sidecar for proposers to create commitments. Validators need to run Commit Boost which uses a validator BLS key to sign messages signaling their intent to register on ETHGas exchange platform and delegate to more sophisticated parties (e.g. our Pricer server) to sell preconfs

Link: https://github.com/ethgas-developer/ethgas-preconf-commit-boost-module

Collateral & Slashing

Validators sell different types of commitments and are held to honor those commitments. In the event they do not honor their commitments, this is considered a Slashable Event or Default.

What is Considered a Slashable Event?

  • Slashable events include both Liveness Faults and Safety Faults as outlined in this article: https://ethresear.ch/t/based-preconfirmations/17353

  • In the event a block is missed for any reason not related to the Proposer fulfilling their duties for the said block, then any fees paid for guarantees will be refunded to the buyer with the Validator being relieved of any commitments.

Providing Collateral

Validators are able to provide collateral by either:

  • Staking ETH directly within an L1 collateral smart contract. Note that this collateral will not accrue Consensus/Execution layer rewards during such time, or

  • Collateral AVS - our Eigenlayer AVS that enables natively staked ETH to be provided as security. See the Collateral AVS page for further information.

Collateral Amounts

Proposers are recommended, but not required, to post at least 1 ETH collateral per slot as collateral held against the non-delivery of commitments. There are two metrics used for collateral calculation purposes:

  • Trading Account Collateral

  • Collateral per Slot

The Trading Account Collateral is the total possible amount of ETH that can be used as collateral. The Collateral per Slot is the total possible amount of ETH that can be used as collateral, per slot.

For example, let's assume a Validator posts 10 ETH as Trading Account Collateral, and then determines the Collateral per Slot to be 1 ETH. This then exposes the Validator to a maximum loss of 1 ETH per slot for up to a maximum of 10 slots of blockspace. In the event the Validator has say 15 slots within the look-ahead, the Validator will only be allowed to sell up to 2/3rds of the blockspace (in any order) accordingly. Once that threshold has been reached, the Validator would need to top-up additional collateral.

The Collateral per Slot will be broadcasted to the Buyers enabling them to price their counterparty risk accordingly. Higher collateral amounts will generally confer greater blockspace prices/rewards to Validators.

We currently make no distinction between faults due to defaults on sequencing rights vs inclusion preconfirmations. That is, defaults of either type are weighted proportionate to the amount of blockspace utilized and not to the 'type' of preconfirmation sold.

We expect to update this in due course with feedback from the community where perhaps the majority of the collateral will be held as reserve against Sequencing Rights defaults, and the minority held held against Inclusion Preconfs. This is still currently under review.

While the 1 ETH number is arbitrary, we feel it provides an accessible/sufficient threshold to Buyers in the near-term, and yet is still accessible to most larger Validators for which will be the early adopters. As more information is gathered, both preconf buyers and the market in general will be able to better understand and price counterparty risk accordingly. As such, collateral requirements may change subject to market conditions and further research.

Execution of Slashing Event

Both collateral staking methods adopt a similar slashing approach which is an optimistic slashing logic.

  • For the Onchain Approach, ETHGas exchange can submit a slashing request on-chain when we spot a breach in preconf promise after a confirmed block proposed by our participating validator. Then, the to-be-slashed validator can submit an on-chain rebuttal by giving out signed preconf merkle root and other block metadata. This can create a relatively decentralized arbitration method fairer to both validators and the exchange.

In the event of default, the validators will be slashed an amount consistent with the gas units involved and relative to 1 ETH per 1 million blockspace collateral requirement

Default Pricing Settings for Validators

The Proposer must decide to sell either the Whole Block, or a mix of Inclusion and Execution Preconfs. The assumption is that Proposers will not take an active or dynamic approach to selling block space products however - and they will prefer a default setting which will automatically seek to maximize validator fees.

  • Default 1: As the Whole block is worth strictly more than any mix of the Inclusion and Execution Preconfs - the risk-neutral fee maximisation option is to sell the Whole Block provided there is sufficient information to price the block accordingly. The ‘sufficient information’ is currently defined as [ x ] liquidity in the previous [ 2 ] slots and at least two bids.

  • Default 2: The second option is to sell a mix of Inclusion and Execution preconfs up to a maximum of a predefined amount of blockspace (e.g. 20 mm units).

Learn more about the PBMS Flow in the Architecture section

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Last updated 15 days ago